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DIRT LAWYERS AND DIRTY REMICS
Bradley T. Borden & David J. Reiss*
The day-to-day practice of real estate law does not touch on the intricacies of the
securitization of mortgages, let alone the tax laws that apply to mortgage-backed securities. And
that is okay. What is not okay is that securitization professionals did not account for the day-today practices of dirt lawyers as they relate to the transfer and assignment of mortgage notes and
mortgages when structuring mortgage-backed securities. The consequences of this may turn out
to be severe for investors, underwriters, and securitization professionals.
But of equal gravity is the responsibility that this imposes on dirt lawyers, as members of
society with specialized knowledge, to help shape policy. As the business cycle turns and the
mortgage markets rise from the depths of the Bust, dirt lawyers should be sure to make their
views known about the role that law should play in the business of real estate finance. In
particular, they should make clear how formalistic legal rules protect the parties to a real estate
finance transaction and that these rules should be treated with appropriate deference. That
formalism can protect the borrower from paying the debt more than once or to the wrong party.
It can also protect the owner of the note from disputes over whether the underlying debt should
be paid.
Take, for example, the negotiability of mortgage notes, which is governed by the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). Notes can be sold by the thousands in run of the mill
secondary market transactions. Negotiable notes are much better for lenders than non-negotiable
ones, so lenders are incentivized to properly negotiate them. Trusts are bulk purchasers of
negotiable instruments which put the “security” in mortgage-backed securities (MBS). These
trusts are best protected if they are holders in due course of the negotiable instruments and are
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thusly incentivized to ensure that the note was properly negotiated. The rules of negotiability are
quite clear, designed as they were for a broad swath of the commercial world. Negotiation of a
typical mortgage note requires delivery and the payee’s signature or endorsement.
Notwithstanding these incentives and clear rules, a mountain of recently revealed evidence
indicates that many notes in secondary market transactions were not properly negotiated.
One of the consequences of the sale of a negotiable note not done in accordance with the
requirements of the holder in due course doctrine is that the purchaser of the note may not be free
of the personal defenses that the note maker (borrower) would have had against the original
lender. (The personal defenses include lack of consideration; non-performance; actual payment
of the debt; and fraud in the inducement. UCC § 3-302.) Another consequence of the sale of a
note that is not done properly is that the beneficial owner (as opposed to the legal owner) may
not be able to collect on the debt if the borrower is in default. And a third – and until recently
hidden -- consequence of an improper sale of a note to a secondary market participant is that the
purchaser may fail to comply with requirements necessary to obtain favorable tax treatment as a
Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit, a REMIC.

Modern Residential Real Estate Finance
Before 1986, complex mortgage-backed securities had various tax-related inefficiencies.
First amongst them, these securities were taxable at the entity level and so investors faced double
taxation. Wall Street firms successfully lobbied Congress to do away with double taxation in
1986. This legislation created the Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit (REMIC), which
was not taxed at the entity level. This one change automatically boosted its yields over other
forms of mortgage-backed securities that would otherwise be taxed. Unsurprisingly, REMICs
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displaced these other types of mortgage-backed securities and soon became the dominant choice
of entity for such transactions.
A REMIC allows for the pooling of mortgage loans that can then be issued as a multipletranche mortgage-backed security. A REMIC is intended to be a passive investment in a static
pool of mortgages. Because of its passive nature, a REMIC is limited as to how and when it can
acquire mortgages. In particular, a REMIC must in most cases acquire its mortgages within
three months after its start-up. 26 U.S.C. § 860G(a)(3), (9). The Internal Revenue Code
provides for draconian penalties for REMICs that fail to comply with applicable legal
requirements, the REMIC rules.
In the 1990s, the housing finance industry, still faced with the patchwork of state and
local laws relating to real estate, sought to streamline the process of assigning mortgages from
the loan originator to a mortgage pool. Industry players, including Fannie and Freddie and the
Mortgage Bankers Association, advocated for The Mortgage Electronic Recording System
(“MERS”), which was up and running by the end of the decade. A MERS mortgage contains a
statement that “MERS is a separate corporation that is acting solely as nominee for the Lender
and Lender’s successors and assigns. MERS claims to be the mortgagee under this Security
Instrument.” MERS is not, however, named on any note endorsement. This new system saved
lenders small but not insignificant amounts of money in recording fees and administrative costs
every time a mortgage was transferred. But the legal status of this private recording system was
not clear and had not been ratified by Congress. Notwithstanding that fact, nearly all of the
major mortgage originators participated in MERS and it registered millions of mortgages within
a couple of years. By 2009 MERS claimed to be the nominal mortgagee on approximately twothirds of all newly-originated residential loans.
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Beginning in the early 2000s, MERS and other parties in the mortgage securitization
industry began to relax many of the procedures and practices they originally used to assign
mortgages among industry players. Litigation documents and decided cases reveal how relaxed
the procedures and practices became. Hitting a crescendo right before the global financial crisis,
loan origination and securitization practices became egregiously negligent.

The Rule of Law in the Business of Real Estate
Even though some securitizers may have followed the terms contained in the applicable
Pooling and Servicing Agreements that governed REMIC mortgaged-backed securities, the very
low tolerance for deviation in the REMIC rules suggests that partial compliance could result in a
finding that individual REMICs fail to comply with the strict requirements of the Internal
Revenue Code. This would cause those REMICs to lose their preferred tax status. Surprisingly,
however, the IRS appears to be unresponsive to this issue so far, and its failure probably
contributed to the financial crisis to some extent. See Bradley T. Borden, Did the IRS Cause the
Financial Crisis?, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 18, 2012), available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bradley-t-borden/did-the-irs-cause-the-fin_b_1972207.html.
To obtain REMIC classification, a trust must satisfy several requirements. Of particular
interest is the previously mentioned requirement that within three months after the trust’s startup
date substantially all of its assets must be qualified mortgages. See IRC § 860D(a)(4). The
regulations provide that substantially all of the assets of a trust are qualified mortgages if no
more than a de minimis amount of the trust’s assets are not qualified mortgages. Treas. Reg. §
1.860D-1(b)(3)(i). A “qualified mortgage” is an obligation that is principally secured by an
interest in real property. See IRC § 860G(a)(3)(A). Thus, to be a qualified mortgage, an asset

4
1/31/2013

DRAFT

Borden & Reiss

DIRT LAWYERS AND DIRTY REMICS

must satisfy both a timing requirement (be acquired within three months after the startup date)
and definitional requirement (be an obligation principally secured by an interest in real property).
Industry practices raise questions about whether trusts satisfied either the timing
requirement or the definitional requirement. The general practice was for trusts and loan
originators to enter into Pooling and Servicing Agreements, which required the originator to
transfer the mortgage note and mortgage to the trust. Nonetheless, reports and court documents
indicate that originators and trusts frequently did not comply with the terms of the Pooling and
Servicing Agreements and originators often retained possession of the mortgage notes as MERS
became the nominee of record on the mortgage.
The failure to properly transfer the mortgage note and mortgage may cause the trusts to
fail both the timing requirement and the definitional requirement that are necessary to qualify for
REMIC status. They fail the timing requirement because they do not acquire the requisite
interests within the three-month prescribed time frame. They fail the definition requirement
because they do not legally own the proper obligations, and what they do legally own does not
appear to be secured by interests in real property.

Wall Street Rules or Legal Rules?
While Wall Street treated the REMIC rules with disregard, they are actually pretty
straightforward in broad outline. Federal tax law does not rely upon the state-law definition of
ownership, but it looks to state law to determine parties’ rights, obligations, and interests in
property. See, e.g., Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932). The tax definition of ownership
would apply to the mortgage notes. See Bradley T. Borden & David J. Reiss, Beneficial
Ownership and the REMIC Classification Rules, 28 TAX MGMT. REAL EST. J. 274 (Nov. 7,
2012). Tax law can also disregard the transfer (or lack of transfer) of formal title where the
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transferor retains many of the benefits and burdens of ownership. See Bailey v. Comm’r, 912
F2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1990). Courts focus on whether the benefits and burdens of ownership pass
from one party to another when considering who is the owner of property for tax purposes. Grodt
& McKay Realty, Inc. v. Comm’r, 77 T.C. 1221, 1237 (1981). The analysis of ownership does
not merely look to the agreements the parties entered into because the label parties give to a
transaction does not determine its character. See Helvering v. Lazarus & Co. 308 U.S. 252, 255
(1939). The analysis must examine the underlying economics and the attendant facts and
circumstances to determine who owns the mortgage notes for tax purposes. See id.
Courts in many states have considered the legal rights and obligations of REMICs with
respect to mortgage notes and mortgages they claim to own. Courts are split, with some ruling in
favor of MERS as nominee for the REMIC and others ruling in favor of other parties whose
interests are adverse to the REMIC and to MERS. Apparently, no court has considered how
significant these rules are with respect to REMIC classification for tax purposes. Standing to
foreclose and participate in a bankruptcy proceeding will likely affect the tax analysis of whether
REMIC trust assets are secured by an interest in real property, but they probably do not affect the
tax analysis of whether the REMIC trusts own obligations. (The lack of standing should result in
a finding that the mortgage note is not secured by an interest in real property.) This analysis turns
on the ownership of the mortgage notes.
The practices at Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (one of the nation’s largest loan
originators in terms of volume during the Boom and now part of Bank of America) illustrate the
outrageous behavior of mortgage securitizers during that period of time. The court in In re Kemp
documents in painful detail how Countrywide failed to transfer possession of a note to the pool
backing a MBS so that Countrywide failed to comply with the requirements necessary for that
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mortgage to comply with the REMIC rules. See In re Kemp, 440 F.R. 624 (Bkrtcy D.N.J. 2010).
Numerous other filings and reports suggest that Countrywide’s practices were typical of many
major lenders during the early 2000s. A suit filed by the New York Attorney General also
details in its allegations how loan originators and REMIC sponsors colluded to populate
REMICs with mortgages that did not comply with the REMIC rules. See Complaint, New York
v. J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, NO. 451556/2012 (County of New York, Oct. 10, 2012). A suit
filed on behalf of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae also alleges the practices of loan originators that
have negative implications for REMICs’ tax-advantaged status. See Complaint, Federal Housing
Finance Agency v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., No. 11 Civ. 6188 (DLC) (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2012).
The practices of loan originators and REMIC sponsors have caused severe losses and
have undermined the American property system. Significant litigation has grown out of those
losses. To date, hundreds of suits have been filed that allege a range of behaviors in the
securitization industry that have consequences for the REMIC rules. See Developments in Real
Estate Finance, available at http://refinblog.com/ (tracking changes in the law and practices of
the real estate finance industry). The resulting tax consequences for REMICs that failed to
comply with the REMIC rules may be staggering.
Kemp addressed the issue of enforceability of a note under the UCC for bankruptcy
purposes. See In re Kemp, 440 B.R. 624 (Bkrtcy D.N.J. 2010). The court in that case held that a
note was unenforceable against the maker of the note and the maker’s property under New Jersey
law on two grounds. The court held that because the beneficial owner of the note, the Bank of
New York (the trustee of a pool of mortgages that backed an MBS that included the mortgage at
issue in the case), did not have possession and because the note lacked proper endorsement upon
sale, the note was unenforceable. Recognizing that the mortgage note came within the UCC
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definition of negotiable instrument, the court then considered who is entitled to enforce a
negotiable instrument but held that no such person was a party in Kemp.
The flaws that the opinion documents are shocking to even a modestly competent lawyer,
even after the revelations regarding industry practices that have come to light since the Subprime
Bust. These flaws include
The originator failing to convey possession of the note to the intended assignee,
the trustee of the pool
The originator failing to endorse the note to the intended assignee
The originator failing to affix an allonge to the note
The originator producing a Lost Note Certification in the same filing in which it
claims to have located the original note
The originator transferring the note to the trustee after filing its proof of claim
The originator failing to maintain corporate formalities to distinguish it from its
affiliates, as those formalities relate to the issue of possession of the note
The consequences of these flaws play out for i) the borrower, ii) the legal owner of the
debt and iii) the trustee (the beneficial owner) of the pool of mortgages securing the MBS that
includes the mortgage at issue in the case.
As the Kemp court notes, “[f]rom the maker's standpoint,”
it becomes essential to establish that the person who demands payment of a negotiable
note, or to whom payment is made, is the duly qualified holder. Otherwise, the obligor is
exposed to the risk of double payment, or at least to the expense of litigation incurred to
prevent duplicative satisfaction of the instrument. These risks provide makers with a
recognizable interest in demanding proof of the chain of title.
440 B.R. at 631 (quoting Adams v. Madison Realty & Dev., Inc., 853 F.2d 163, 168 (3d Cir. N.J.
1988). And because the originator did not comply with the legal niceties, the beneficial owner of
the debt, the trustee, cannot file its proof of claim either.
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The Kemp court does not address the third type of consequence (for the trustee) because
it is not an issue that is before the court. Nonetheless, the Kemp court’s analysis illustrates how
courts may reach results that undercut arguments that REMICs were the owners of the mortgage
notes and mortgages that were purportedly sold to them for REMIC rules purposes.
Even if the majority of jurisdictions issue foreclosure and bankruptcy rulings that have
favorable consequences for REMICs, the few that do not can destroy the REMIC classification
of many mortgage-back securities that were structured to be—and promoted to investors as—
REMICs. This is because rating agencies require that REMICs be geographically diversified in
order to spread the risk of defaults caused by local economic conditions. Most, if not all,
REMICs will own mortgage notes and mortgages from states governed by laws that the courts
determine do not support REMIC eligibility for the mortgages from those jurisdictions. This
diversification requirement makes it very likely that REMICs will have more than a de minimis
amount of mortgages that do not come within the definition of qualified mortgage under the
REMIC regulations. Professionals who helped structure these securitizations may face liability
if the IRS were to find that a purported REMIC was just purported and not a REMIC.
As lawsuits arising from the Subprime Boom allocate liability and damages arising from
faulty securitizations – dirty REMICs -- among investors, underwriters and securitization
professionals, lawyers may feel no more empowered to take corrective action than homeowners
do. We might feel as if we do not have much leverage over lenders, over title companies, over
Wall Street firms. And indeed, we don’t. But as members of bar associations and trade
associations, as informed constituents of elected officials, as wielders of the pen, we can attempt
to influence policy and industry practices that we believe to be harmful to a well-ordered real
estate market.
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If you look back to the Subprime Boom in the early 2000s, do you recollect saying that
things can’t keep going on like this? Well, you were right and we are now suffering the serious
consequences. Let us now commit to speaking out in real-time to reduce the chances that history
repeats itself, at least in our lifetimes.

Summary: Real estate lawyers have a duty to explain how legal rules protect the parties to a real
estate finance transaction and should advocate that these rules be treated with appropriate deference in
order to protect the financial system from irrational exuberance.

Keywords: mortgage-backed securities, MBS, Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit,
REMIC, dirt lawyers
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